In a country where every nuance of public statements from senior figures is carefully considered, it is very hard to dismiss as careless hyperbole the recent warning of Zhou Xioachuan, chairman of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the Chinese central bank, that China faces “a Minsky moment”.
Significantly, the warning about the potentially severe consequences of excessive optimism and the build-up of debt within China came at the country’s high profile National Party Conference (NPC) in October.
Given the context and unusual frankness of the comments, Zhou’s assessment was, in our view, as clear an indication as investors get in China that the authorities are serious in addressing the issue of high debt levels.
This has not always been the case. Conflicting political and economic interests have historically resulted in inconsistent policy objectives and a familiar boom/bust cyclical narrative. In particular, an explicit and somewhat arbitrary growth target for GDP effectively encouraged significant debt-financed investment at local government level.
But times are changing.
And while a relatively steady growth rate is still important as China builds towards the 100th anniversary of the founding of Communist Party in 2021, the omission of specific GDP growth targets in President Xi Jinping’s keynote NPC address was, in our view, particularly notable.
We see the omission as further compelling evidence of the shift in China’s policy priorities towards the quality and sustainability of growth, rather than just the pace of growth.
With Xi’s position not merely secure but emboldened, the Chinese premier now has a clear mandate to build further on deleveraging progress to-date.
Where is all the debt?
We focus on what we believe are the three key areas of leverage within the Chinese economy:
Corporate Debt: The corporate sector accounts for just under 60% of all debt in China—roughly 160% of GDP. This ratio is among the highest in the world and is significantly higher than that of Korea, US, UK, the EU or Japan.
Since 2008, corporate debt as a percentage of GDP has nearly doubled.
There are no official figures on the amount of debt in China’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the government-owned businesses that remain at the heart of the Chinese economy.
Local Government Debt: While Local Government accounts for around 16% of all debt in China and 44% of GDP, many observers point to it as the most likely source of defaults.
Mixing policy and commercial imperatives, China’s local governments borrowed heavily to meet growth targets, circumventing rules designed to curb excessive debt by using dedicated Financing Vehicles and by borrowing from the shadow banking sector.
Household Debt: The pace of growth in household debt is accelerating. At similar levels of GDP to the Local Government sector, household debt in China still has room to grow without prompting concern, but at some point debt servicing will clearly curtail consumption growth.
What is the outlook for Chinese growth in 2018?
The pace of growth in the Chinese economy will slow in 2018 as the deleveraging process continues.
This reflects the impact of tightening policies already in place and in particular the impact of deleveraging policies on infrastructure spend (due to the tightening in local government finance), a slowing housing market and property construction.
But we do not believe that the effect of deleveraging policies to date will prompt a hard landing for the Chinese economy.
Our base case is that consumer spending remains resilient. But for an economy that is seeking to increasingly rely on consumption growth going forward, a sharp correction in house prices is clearly a risk both to consumer spending and to the wider economy given how significant a role residential construction plays.
But overall we believe that the process of deleveraging will be relatively gradual and well managed. What gives us a degree of confidence that China can avoid a liquidity-driven hard landing is the belief that the PBoC has both a deeper understanding of bank liquidity needs and a broader toolkit to measure liquidity and to adjust it should it prove necessary.
China’s one party political system also makes adjusting policy a straightforward process.
A good example of the PBoC’s more nuanced approach was the cut in the Reserve Requirement Ratio in late September for banks that meet specific criteria on lending to micro enterprises.
Not a big deal in itself, but a small move that simultaneously reduced risks to the economy while ensuring new credit is deployed more efficiently in higher value activity.
Given the Chinese economy’s historic volatility, a degree of scepticism is perhaps understandable with regard to the authorities’ ability to navigate the deleveraging process successfully without provoking a hard landing. But in our view, the progress to-date and the very noticeable shift in rhetoric and policy focus all bode well for the future.
Perhaps it’s time to give credit where credit’s due.
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