UBS RACE STRATEGY BRIEFING
2012 FORMULA 1 GRAND PRIX DU CANADA


Montréal, 8-10 June 2012

UBS Race Strategy Briefing

The UBS Race Strategy Briefing before each Grand Prix gives you the lowdown on all the vital considerations the F1 teams will take on board when deciding what Race Strategy to use in the forthcoming Grand Prix. A bad decision can cost a race victory, whereas a bold gamble can sometimes steal one from the jaws of defeat. So put yourself in the know and get the inside line on how the race will be won.

UBS Race Strategy Report

The UBS Race Strategy Report is a unique analysis of the key decisions on the pit wall and in the cockpit that decided the outcome of the latest Grand Prix. It's the indispensable guide to the who, the why and the how behind every Grand Prix result.


Year

Driver

Constructor

2011

Jenson Button

McLaren-Mercedes

2010

Lewis Hamilton

McLaren-Mercedes

2009

Not held

 

2008

Robert Kubica

BMW Sauber

2007

Lewis Hamilton

McLaren-Mercedes

2006

Fernando Alonso

Renault

2005

Kimi Räikkönen

McLaren-Mercedes

2004

Michael Schumacher

Ferrari

2003

Michael Schumacher

Ferrari

2002

Michael Schumacher

Ferrari

2001

Ralf Schumacher

Williams-BMW

2000

Michael Schumacher

Ferrari

1999

Mika Häkkinen

McLaren-Mercedes

Strategy Brief

Montréal – 4.36 kilometers. Race distance - 70 laps = 305 kilometers. 12 corners in total. A circuit made up of straights, chicanes and a hairpin.

Aerodynamic setup – Medium downforce. Top speed 326km/h (with Drag Reduction System active on rear wing) - 316km/h without.

Full throttle – 60% of the lap (quite high. 15 seconds unbroken full throttle on main straight. Total fuel needed for race distance – 142 kilos (average/high).

Fuel consumption – 2.0kg per lap (average/high).

Time spent braking: 17% of lap (high). 7 braking zones.  Brake wear- Very High. 

Loss time for a Pit stop = 11.2 seconds (very fast)
Total time needed for pit stop: 15.2 seconds.

Fuel effect (cost in lap time per 10kg of fuel carried): 0.28 seconds (low).

Montréal is always one of the most interesting races of the season from a strategy point of view. With a very high likelihood of safety cars, a low grip surface and very easy overtaking, it is always an entertaining race.

Montréal has several long straights linked with chicanes and a hairpin. There are no high-speed corners to speak of. Good traction out of slow corners is essential as is good straight-line speed and a car that is good over the kerbs.

This year the performance of the rather erratic Pirelli tyres will be a decisive factor as will the effect of the adjustable DRS wing. Last year in Montreal there were two DRS zones, but this year to make it less easy, there is just one - on the long back straight - and it’s 100 metres shorter than last year.

Montréal is an unusual circuit in that it is a road circuit based on an island and is only used for racing twice a year. The track is very dirty at the start of the weekend and improves dramatically as the weekend goes on, although the grip level remains low. So the strategists have to predict what the tyres are going to do in the race, based on data, which is a moving target.

The FORMULA 1 GRAND PRIX DU CANADA 2012 is the seventh round of the 2012 FIA F1 World Championship.

Qualifying is less important at Montréal than many other circuits, because overtaking is easy and this also has a big bearing on race strategy, pushing teams towards more stops rather than less.

However the statistics for this season show that the car which leads on the opening lap is likely to win the race; this has happened in four of the five dry races to date. This is because it is beneficial to the tyres to drive in clear air rather than following another car. They last longer and perform better, by a significant margin.

The circuit’s characteristics should suit the Mercedes and Lotus cars in particular. If it’s cold, then the Mercedes will have the edge, if it’s hot it will be the Lotus.

Meanwhile the Ferrari has always been strong in Montréal, but so far this year their car has been weaker than its rivals on straight-line speed. However some updates are promised for this weekend, which may help that. The Ferrari is good in traction and works well on the super soft Pirelli which is the likely qualifying and first stint tyre this weekend.

Red Bull has come into form since Bahrain with two wins from three races.
Historically this has not been one of Red Bull’s strongest circuits; downforce isn’t a major factor here.

McLaren has been fast in qualifying but less good in the race recently.

As far as drivers’ form is concerned; Michael Schumacher is the king of Montreal, having won the race seven times.  It is also one of Lewis Hamilton’s strongest tracks – he has won there twice.  Jenson Button, Fernando Alonso and Kimi Raikkonen have all won the race.

Being coastal and set on a seaway, Montréal can experience extremes of weather for the race; it can be very hot and humid, but also cold and wet. This will have a huge bearing on the tyres. In the week preceding the event, there were temperatures of 15 degrees on one day and 28 degrees on another. It is the most extreme circuit location for temperature variations.

Pirelli tyre choice for Montreal: Prime tyre is soft (yellow markings) and Option tyre is supersoft (red markings)

This is the same tyre choice as Monaco, where the performance of the tyres surprised many people. Both the soft and super soft ran for longer than expected making it a one stop strategy race.

The key to making the supersoft last is to limit wheel spin with the rear tyres. This happens when the drivers accelerate out of the low speed corners. Strangely with the Pirellis the drivers find it more difficult to feel wheel spin and as traction control is banned in F1, it’s a delicate thing to control.

The difference between the two tyres is estimated to be around 0.8 secs to 1 second per lap in qualifying trim.

The temperatures will be the key to the weekend. Hot conditions will force the teams to change the tyres more frequently.

At Montreal this weekend the key to strategy will be to plan your fastest race from lights to flag. Because of the ease of passing, track position is less important than at many other venues. The most important thing is to qualify well and run your fastest race and see where that puts you at the end, because you will not have problems overtaking. Running in clear air as much of the race as possible is key, so if a car doesn’t qualify as well as expected, we may see the team try and aggressive strategy to keep the driver in clear air.

But as the track is constantly improving and getting faster, it is unlikely that the strategists will have enough data by the start of the race to know for certain which is the better of the two tyres to be on. It will be based on reacting to what others are doing quickly. This should make it one of the most interesting as well as action-packed races of the season.

The pit lane at Montréal is short and therefore pit stops are very fast at around 18.7 seconds. This pushes strategists to consider making more stops.

A three-stop strategy is marginally faster than two stops. One stop would mean that the car was ahead of the two and three stoppers at their final stops, but they would easily be able to pass the one stopper in the closing stages on his worn tyres. However a safety car would swing things towards the one stopper.

The chances of a safety car at Montréal are very high at 67%. There is an average of 0.8 safety cars per race. Seven of the last ten Canadian Grands Prix have featured a safety car.

This is because, with the track lined with walls and several blind corners, there are frequent accidents and the conditions for the marshals when clearing an accident are dangerous.

The run to the first corner in Montréal is short and there have been many first corner incidents over the years. But it is also a first corner where there are many lines and making up places is possible.

In the last dry race here in 2010, for example, only the front four cars ended the first lap in the same position in which they started!

As far as 2012 start performance is concerned drivers have gained (+) or lost (-) places off the start line this season, on aggregate, as follows:

Gained:

+23 Massa

+19 Kovalainen

+18 Glock

+14 Alonso

+8 Perez

+12 Raikkonen

+9 Senna

+8 Maldonado*

+7 Pic

+5 Schumacher*

+6 Kobayashi*

+5 Hamilton, Vergne

+ 4 Di Resta , Karthikeyan

+ 2  Vettel

+1 Button, Rosberg

 

Held position: Petrov

Lost:

-1 Grosjean

-3 De la Rosa *

- 4 Hulkenberg

- 7 Webber

-10 Ricciardo

* Eliminated by or involved in first lap accident in Monaco

Of course good strategy planning also requires good pit stop execution by the mechanics and we have seen tyre stops carried out in less than two and a half seconds by F1 teams. Here again Ferrari leads the way consistently this year.

It is also clear that the field has significantly closed up in pit stops. The top four teams fastest stops were within 4/10ths of a second of each other in Spain. It shows how much work has gone on in this area.

The league table below shows the order of the pit crews based on their fastest time in the FORMULA 1 GRAND PRIX DE MONACO, from the car entering the pit lane to leaving it. The positions from previous race are in brackets.

Worth noting is that Marussia did a faster stop than many established teams and Mercedes reclaimed the top spot after Ferrari had topped the table in recent races.

Rank Team Pit stop time
1= Mercedes 24.874s
1= Red Bull
25.079s
3 Ferrari 24.993s
4 Force India 25.642s
5 McLaren 25.219s
6 Toro Rosso
25.335s
7 Williams 26.410s
8 Lotus 26.380s
9 Sauber 25.666s
10 Caterham
26.066s
11 HRT 27.306s

The UBS Race Strategy Briefing is written by James Allen with input and data from several F1 team strategists and from Pirelli.


Strategy Report

The Canadian Grand Prix was always set to be a close finish because of the nature of the track, the options for race strategy and the effectiveness of the DRS rear wing for overtaking.

And it was also because the data shows that the performance of the McLaren, Red Bull and Ferrari on race day was remarkably close, perhaps only a tenth or two of a second in it. The difference was tyre management and, more importantly, strategy.

The race had three leaders, any one of whom could have won the race; pole sitter Sebastian Vettel finished fourth, Fernando Alonso led with seven laps to go and finished 5th, while Lewis Hamilton was the only driver to make a 2 stop strategy really work and he won.

Post race, Red Bull and Ferrari have been accused of making strategy errors which cost the race, but is it true?

Here is our customary in depth analysis of how - and why - the big decisions got taken, with input and data from some of the decision makers.

Background
The danger with doing one stop in Montreal is that, although you are in front of a two stopper when he comes out from his second stop, he's on fresh tyres and with the DRS wing he will find it easy to pass you. However with a 71% chance of a safety car, which would swing the race to the one stoppers, it can be worth a gamble for midfield runners looking to make up places.

To gamble from the front row of the grid, however is a different matter.

Practice on Friday had shown the teams that the tyre degradation was not a problem and that it would be possible to do one stop effectively, even if it would mean a fair amount of nursing the tyres. However McLaren were convinced that they needed to do two stops, so it would be an attacking race for Lewis Hamilton. They believed that a two stop would be around 10 seconds faster than a one stop.

McLaren only really had one car running on Friday, as Jenson Button lost most of the day to an and oil leak and double gearbox change. Meanwhile Ferrari didn't really do any long running, the longest run was a 12 lap stint by Massa, but this was punctuated by slow laps. And this may well have contributed to what happened on Sunday.

But the track temperature on race day was 15 degrees hotter than Friday and going into the race even teams who had plenty of data on the long run performance of the tyres could not be sure that one stop would turn out better. The only way to find out would be to try it and to monitor the heat degradation, because when it comes in with these Pirelli tyres it is very sudden and the lap times drop off straight away.

The rear tyres were the limitation, and the soft tyre looked like the preferred race tyre.

How the race got away from Alonso and Vettel and went towards Hamilton
The leaders got away in grid order with Vettel leading Hamilton and Alonso. But at the first round of stops, where they all switched from used supersofts to new softs the order changed: Vettel pitted first on lap 16, Hamilton on lap 17 and Alonso on lap 19. Hamilton jumped Vettel in the stops and Alonso jumped both of them. But it took Alonso's Ferrari time to warm up the tyres and Hamilton attacked and repassed him for the lead.

So for the second stint the order was Hamilton, Alonso, Vettel. At this point all three had the option to stop again.

Only Hamilton knew for sure that he wouldn't be doing that and so, with clear air ahead of him, he kept pushing. He opened out a gap of four seconds on Alonso and maintained it. For Alonso and Vettel the problem was not knowing how hard to push, as they didn't want to find themselves one stopping and have the tyres go off at the end, but equally they didn't want to do too little and find at the end that the tyres still had plenty to offer.

Decision time
Hamilton noticed that the other two were not staying with him and asked his team if they were certain that Alonso and Vettel were not one-stopping. The team reassured him. This confirmed to Red Bull and Ferrari that Hamilton was stopping again and they will have recalculated their race model based on this information. It will have shown them ahead of him after his second stop, but the unknown was still the tyre degradation on this warm day.

In the laps leading up to Hamilton's stop, Alonso's pace was consistent; in the high 1m 17s and low 1m 18s. Vettel's was a few tenths slower and he sat 3 seconds behind Alonso.

When Hamilton pitted on lap 50 Ferrari and Red Bull had a decision to make. Should they react and pit too? In Vettel's case he would not have got ahead of Hamilton by doing that, but he may have got Alonso.

Ferrari's decision was more finely balanced. As he came down the back straight, Alonso had a lead of 14.8 seconds over Hamilton, about the time it takes to make a four second pitstop. With Ferrari's strong pit stop performance there was every reason to believe that Alonso would be at least side by side with Hamilton as he exited the pits, but more likely just ahead. However they knew from the first stops that Hamilton might be able to pass them again as they struggled to warm the tyres.

But they were concerned about Vettel too. So they did not pit Alonso on lap 51. But they had perhaps also taken their eye off the other cars coming through from behind, especially Grosjean.

At this stage Alonso could have pitted and rejoined ahead of Grosjean, consolidating his position. However they had some time to reflect, because even if they were to pit and come out behind Grosjean, the Ferrari on fresh tyres and with DRS would have no problem passing the Lotus on worn tyres.

The longer they and Red Bull left it, the more other cars came into the picture, like Perez, whose signature strategy seems to be to get to the flag quickly on one stop. So even a delayed pitstop in the laps after Hamilton's would still have given both Alonso and Vettel a podium, but they didn't do that either.

This is one of those situations where it is easy to say with hindsight that they made a mistake. Ferrari thought they would get similar tyre performance to Lotus and Sauber and make a one stop work. Rather than blame the strategy, they blame the tyre degradation.

However what puzzles rival strategists is that by the decisive moment around lap 51/52, the other Ferrari driver Felipe Massa's tyres were 40 laps old and already showing signs of going off. Perhaps Ferrari estimated that Alonso would have better wear, but they were looking to get 51 laps out of Alonso's tyres, ten more than Massa had done to that point.

So it's hard to see where their confidence to stick with one stop came from.

Even as late as lap 60, when Grosjean was just 10 seconds behind Alonso, the models showed that Ferrari could have pitted Alonso, who would have rejoined 5 seconds behind the Frenchman and on fresh tyres Alonso would have been able to pass him in the 10 remaining laps, as Vettel did with Alonso when Red Bull realised their mistake and belatedly brought Vettel in with seven laps to go.

Lessons from Canada
Grosjean's result shows that the Lotus has the potential at times to do one stop less than some of its rivals and still be competitive. It's weakness lies in single lap qualifying pace; if Grosjean or Raikkonen could start in the front five, ahead of Rosberg for example, then they could really make their tyre advantage pay.

Perez' excellent podium again highlights his ability to keep the pace up while also protecting the tyres. It must be a combination of many details in his driving, that he has brought with him into F1, because Kobayashi in the other car can rarely stretch the tyres out in the same way.

Perhaps more worryingly, this was the second race which could be done by cruising around on a one stop strategy and although the climax was exciting due to Hamilton's strategy, the majority of the race was quite dull and processional.

These cars and tyres work best in two or three stop races, where the drivers are able to have periods when they can push more.

The UBS Race Strategy Report is written by James Allen with input and data from several F1 team strategists and from Pirelli

Race History Graph